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INTRODUCTION 
An example of a long standing arrangement for economic integration 
in Afr ica which operates in a very special environment is the case of the 
former High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland 
(Lesotho) and Swaziland. (BLS). Geographically and ethnically these three 
countries, now, or, in the case of Swaziland, shortly to be independent, are 
closely related to the Republic of South Africa. For many years they had the 
closest of economic ties with that country. Indeed, for most of their history 
as separate territories, it was assumed, both by Britain and by South Africa 
that they would ultimately be absorbed within the latter . Provision for their 
incorporation was in fact made in the Act of 1309 which created the Union of 
South Africa, although it was subsequently made clear that this provision 
would not become effective unless the British Parliament was consulted and 
the wishes of the inhabitants were considered. During the following fifty 
years it was an object of South African policy to secure the incorporation 
of the territories into the Union. (1) With the development of apartheid, 
voluntary incorporation became out of the question and, by the earlv 1950's 
the dialogue about an ultimate transfer of the territories terminated. 
Britain began to prepare the territories for independence, and the South 
African government accepted that its future relations with the territories 
would be those appropriate to sovereign states. Nevertheless, economic links 
in the shape of legal and dc facto integration arrangements continue to 
operate as in the past. As independence has approached, some consideration 
has been given by the Colonial office and the local administrations to the 
merits of these arrangements and to possible alternatives . This has been 
stimulated partly by the need for the territories to determine their positions 
in relation to the intention of the South African government to produce new 
customs agreements for each of the territories in anticipation of their 
transition to independence- Discussions on new agreements are to take place 
at the end of 1967 . Whatever form they take, which will partly if not mainly 
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be determined by political•considerations, it seems likely that geographical 
and economic considerations will.point to continued close co-operation with 
South Africa a on the part of 3LS unless indeed., no heed is taken of their 
justifiable claims to a new and improved financial deal. 
The Economic Background 
Table 1 sets out some of the salient economic and geographical 
features of the three countries and puts these against the similar magnitudes 
for the Republic of South Africa. 
In area, the three countries taken together amount to more than half 
the size of the Republic, but a great part of the largest of the three 
countries3 Botswana, consists of the sparsely populated and barren Kalahari 
desert. Losetho is wholly an enclave within the boundaries of the Republic 
of South Africa and adjoins the Provinces of Natal on the east. Cape Province 
on the south, and the Orange Free State to the north and west. Most of its 
land is mountainous, and to the east, in the Drakensburgs it attains a height 
of 11,000 feet. Swaziland is surrounded by the Republic on three sides but 
shares a border on the east with Mozambique . Botswana is bounded on the west 
and north by South West Africa, and on the north east by Rhodesia. It also, 
has a very small frontier on the north with Zambia. 
The total population of the three countries in 1966 was approximately 
2 mn . This includes some 175,000 who were temporarily absent from their homes 
in the course of employment in South Africa. (2) By comparison, the 
population of the Republic of South Africa in the same year was 17.85 mn . 
About 20% of the Republic's population is European. There is no European 
settlement in Lesotho, but in both Swaziland and Botswana there is a small 
settled European population which amounts to 3% and 1% of the respective 
populations . In Swaziland nearly one half of the land is owned by the 
European population . 
Botswana is a vast arid table land with an everage rainfall of 19 
inches varying from 12 inches or less in the drier portions to 27 inches in 
the extreme north. The greater Dart of the area consists of Kalahari sand 
veld and is largely uninhabited. Population is concentrated in the sub-
tropical to temperate eastern region which is better watered and contains 
areas of higher elevation . The economy is based on agriculture and livestock . 
TaLle 1. 
LESOTHO, BOTSWANA , SWAZILAND & THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
Economic Structure 
JESOTHO BOTSWANA SWAZILAND REPUBLIC OF 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Area - thousand sq . miles 
Population - thousands, 196G 
Population density - persons 
per sq . mile 
Gross Domestic Product 1965 
-R '000 
G.D.P. per capita - Rand 
Domestic exports 1965 
-R '000 
Imports 1966 - R'000 
Ordinary Revenue 1965/6 
-R'000 
Customs & Excise Duties 1965/6 
-R '000 
Customs St Excise as % of 
Ordinary Revenue 
"U.K. Grant in Aid R'000 
Total Revenue R'000 
Grants in Aid and Customs 
Revenue as % of total Revenue 
12 
359 
72 
37,1+25 
44 
22,917 
4,020 
1,400 
35% 
5,202 
9,222 
220 
559(a) 
27,390 
50 
4,385 10.173(a) 
18,353 
5,443 
7 472 
375 18 -.300 
55 33 
55,000(b) 7,881,000 
160(b) 
33,620 
26,471 
5,796 
72% 
1,021(1964/5) 1,770 
23% (1354/5) 32% 
5,320 3,020 
10.763 3,816 
53% (1964/5) 54% 
430 
1,080,000(c) 
1,645,500 
1,227,715 
239,174 
24% 
Source: Lesotho: Annual Statistical Bulletin 1955, National Accounts 1954/5 
and 1965/5 • Trade Statement 1966; Bureau of Statistics, Maseru. 
Botswana: National Accounts of Botswana 1965, Central Statistical Office, 
Gaberones;Statistical Abstract, Central Statistical Office. 
Swaziland: Annual Statistical Bulletin 1956:, Gross Domestic Product 1960-64. 
• Statistical Office, Mbabane. 
South Africa: Statistical Yearbook 1966;- Bureau of Statistics, Pretoria'. 
International Financial Statistics, June 1967 : International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, U .S .A . 
(a) 1956 
(b) 1964' at 1960 prices 
(c) Excluding exports of gold. 
The main crops are maize and sorghum, much of which is produced for subsistence 
Livestock is the most important source of cash income in agriculture . Mineral 
production is insignificant at present but surveys have revealed the existence 
of extensive coal deposits. Recently extensive copper nickel ore bodies have 
been discovered and their exploitation is likely to commence in 1970. Within 
the country paid employment amounts to only 30,000. In addition perhaps 
35,000 persons, or some 20% of the adult male population are temporarily 
absent, mainly in the Republic. 
The economy of Lesotho is based entirely on the cultivation of 
crops, mainly for subsistence, and on the raising of sheep and goats on which 
the export of wool and mohair is based . There is also some export of cattle . • 
Labour migration is a dominant feature of its economy . According to the 1956 
census 117,000 or more than 4-0% of the adult male population was temporarily 
absent in the Union or elsewhere. ' Known mineral resources are few and so far 
of little value. Industries are virtually non existent. The apparently viable 
Ox-Bow dam scheme on the Madimamatso river would permit the sale of fresh 
water and electricity to the Republic . If it is undertaken it may facilitate 
some snail scale industrial development . 
Swaziland is the smallest of the three countries, but the most 
generously endowed in terms of natural resources and minerals. It enjoys a 
variety of climatic and physical conditions and a good rainfall makes possible 
a variety of agricultural production. Although subsistence agriculture occupie 
the bulk of the population, cash crop production of a variety of crops, not 
only by European farmers but also on estates and by Africans was valued in 
1966 at seven times that of subsistence production and it is of growing 
importance . A rapid growth of irrigation projects in the low region has 
contributed to this. Swaziland's important mineral resources include asbestos, 
iron ore, coal and kaolin. Apart from several large industrial units engaged 
in mining or the processing of local produce (sugar, pulp etc) for export, 
little manufacturing development exists. The paid labour force within the 
county amounted in 1964- to about 25,000 (3) , many of whom were Africans from 
other countries. About 19,000 Swazis find employment in the Republic. With 
the completion of the Swaziland railway the country now has a link to the coast 
through Mozambique . The railway was constructed primarily to facilitate the 
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exploitation of the iron ore deposits, but should also make it possible to 
recommence coal mining and contribute to the more effective exploitation of 
the country's other resources. In recent years, Swaziland appears to have 
enjoyed a remarkably high rate of economic growth. 
For some years the three territories have experienced budget deficits . 
With a quickening of the pace of political advance rapid increases in the 
budget deficits have been experienced as revenues have failed to keep pace 
with increases in expenditure . The gap has been met by grants in aid from the 
British government. In 1965/6 these amounted to Rs. 3.0 mn . for Swaziland, 
or 35 % of ordinary recurrent expenditure. For Botswana the corresponding 
figures were Rs. 5.3 mn. and 53%. For Lesotho Rs . 5.2 mn . and 62%. This 
financial dependence of the three countries is bound up with the fact that 
their budgetary and fiscal policies are profoundly affected by their financial 
and economic relationships with South Africa. These relationships are described 
in the following section. 
The Arrangements for Economic Integration between South Africa and BLS 
The economic integration of BLS with South Africa operates at several 
levels . In the first place there exists a form of common market and customs 
union between them and South Africa. (4) In the second place there is a 
de facto currency union, and banking and other financial links are close. 
Thirdly, a substantial part of the labour force of the three countries is 
employed in the Republic, mainly in the mines. Finally there are close links 
in transport and other services. 
The origins of economic integration between South Africa and BLS 
go back to 1839 when the Cape Colony and the Orange Free State Republic, 
after declaring that it was desirable that there should be a general customs 
union between all of the colonies and states of Southern Africa, initiated a 
preparatory union which provided for free trade between the colonies and states, 
a common external tariff, and an equitable distribution among the participating 
countries of the duties collected . Political union in 1910 between the Cape 
Colony, the Orange Free State, the Transvaal and Natal made the terms of the 
economic union redundant for the Tnomhp^s of the political union. The existing 
customs union was thereupon terminated and replaced by new agreements which 
took account of the position of those territories which were not parties to the 
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political union. -The Agreement signed at Potchefstroom on 29th June 1910 
between the newly established Union of South Africa on the one hand, and 
Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland was one of these. (5) At the time 
of writing it continues to regulate the economic relations of the participating 
countries . 
The essential features of the 1910 Agreement were expressed in 
brief and general terms. It provides for: 
The maintenance of the Customs Union tariff until altered by 
legislation enacted by South Africa or by the territories. 
Free interchange of South African products and manufactures between 
the Union and the territories. 
Payment by South Africa to the territories of an equitable share 
of the duties on goods passing through the Union to the territories and vice 
versa. 
Conformity by the territories to the relevant tariff laws of South 
Africa . 
Wines, beer and spirits of local manufacture were excluded from the 
free interchange clause. These goods are imported in bond from South Africa 
and the territories themselves impose and collect excise duties. Under the 
Agreement these must be at the rates in force in South Africa. 
The Agreement specified the basis of the share of. duties to be 
received by each territory. In effect, revenue from import duties and from 
excise duties on cigarettes, motor fuel and motor vehicles in the customs area. 
(but excluding beers, wines and spirits of South African, manufacture) is 
shared between South Africa and BLS on an assumed derivation basis, the figures 
used for the division being the relative customs revenues of each area in the 
(Table 2) 
three base years preceding 1910. The following shares/were yielded by this 
basis, which has remained in operation as far as South Africa is concerned until 
today. (6) 
Partly as a result of the customs union and partly for geographical 
reasons the three countries are closely linked in trade with the Republic. 
Table 2. 
Distribution of Customs and Excise Revenue under the 1910 Potchefstrcom Agreement 
Percentage 
Share 
98 .68903 
0.38575 
0 .27622 Total share of 
BLS 1.31097%-
0 .14900 
100 
Although accurate data on the origin of imports and destination of 
exports is not available for the territories, necessarily a high proportion 
of their imports and exports pass through South Africa, fbreover, in all .three 
countries South African products dominate the internal markets although in the 
case of Botswana a substantial part of its imports (estimated at a quarter in 
1966) normally comes from Rhodesia. Botswana's trade with Rhodesia has been 
facilitated by a Customs Agreement which was concluded with the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1956. (7) This agreement continues to be operated 
between BLS and Rhodesia but it is of practical importance only for trade 
between Botswana and Rhodesia . Both Botswana and Lesotho market a high proportion 
of their exports, mainly of agricultural products in the Republic. The bulk of 
Swaziland's exports on the other hand are destined for the outside world 
(80% in 1966) though much of these are exported through the Republic. 
Currency - banking and financia1 Institutions 
Currency, banking and financial institutions are a second field in 
which there is economic integration with South Africa. A currency union exists 
and South African notes and coins are legal tender in each territory. Unlike 
the customs union the currency union does not rest on any agreement between 
the territories and the Republic. 
The territories, like South Africa, are part of the sterling area 
and there are in consequence no restrictions on the transfer of funds from the 
U.K. to the territories. The territories allow their own residents to make 
payments freely to other sterling area countries. Their practice in this 
Country 
South Africa 
Lesotho (Basutoland) 
Botswana (Bechuanaland) 
Swaziland 
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respect is more liberal than that of 'South Africa . Residents of BLS are 
treated by South Africa as residents of the rand currency area for current 
account transactions and there are in consequence no restrictions on 
payments of this kind between South Africa and BLS. For transactions .involving 
the sale of South African securities owned by residents of BLS, South 
Africa treats such residents as non resident (to prevent evasion through 
BLS of South African controls on the export of capital) but it is prepared 
administratively to give special treatment. It is believed that South Africa 
administratively restricts the export of. capital in excess of amounts of 
R100,000 for investment in BLS. With these exceptions, capital can move freely 
between South Africa and BLS. 
Because of the free flow of funds between BLS and South Africa their 
interest rates and credit conditions generally'- are closely linked. When credit 
is generally tight in the Republic, commercial bankers tend to restrict their 
lending in BLS whatever the state of those economies and vice versa. The two 
commercial banks which operate in BLS are both branches of banks incorporated 
in the United Kingdom and are closely linked with banks in South Africa. 
Banks operating in BLS customarily employ in South Africa the reserve of liquid 
assets which is maintained against their deposit liabilities . At present 
there are no opportunies for employing such assets in BLS. South African 
building societies and insurance companies collect funds in BLS but invest no 
funds there . 
The remaining field in which BLS are closely linked with the South 
African economy is communications and services. In Swaziland road haulage 
is undertaken mainly by South African Railways . The railway in Botswana is 
operated by Rhodesia Railways which is linked closely with South African 
Railways. In the past the Post Office Savings Banks, and the Post Offices 
were operated by the South African authorities on behalf of the three countries 
but each now has its own system .. All external mail, telephone, telegraph and 
international air services operate through South Africa. South African 
Airways provide part of the scheduled services linking the three countries with 
Johannesburg, though small internal air services also participate in this 
traffic. 
_ g _ 
The Costs and Benefits of Existing Integration Arrangements 
Customs unions and common markets such as exist between South 
Africa and BLS may have a number of advantages . In the first place costs 
of administration may be reduced and smuggling avoided. In this particular 
case the territories are spared the burden of administering their own 
customs and excise system which other things equal is an undoubted advantage 
assuming that the attribution of customs revenue is approximately correct . 
It would be surprising if the proportions received by the three territories 
based as they are on imports in 1906/S accurately reflected current trade 
relations at the end of a period in which, as a result of protection, and 
tariff changes, the character of import demand in South Africa has greatly 
changed and in which the rates of growth of the three territories appeal1 to 
have varied considerably, particularly in recent years. 
In "1963, in anticipation of proposals from the Republic of South 
Africa for the revision of the customs agreement on the independence of the 
territories, an enquiry was made into this matter . The British Government 
appointed'a British statistician, Mr. F. M. M. Lewes, to examine the workings 
of the South African Customs Union as it affected the three territories and 
in particular to examine the share of the customs revenue which they received. 
In his unpublished report he concluded, on the basis of admittedly meagre 
statistics, and estimates of trade movements of the main dutiable articles, 
that the overall share received by the territories continued to be about 
right, but that in the light of current conditions a reapportionment among 
the three countries would be appropriate. (8) The suggested reapportionment 
is indicated below and compared with the original allocation. It involved 
practically halving the share of the poorest of the three, 3asutoland, and 
a more than threefold increase in the share of Swaziland the richest of 
the three. 
The shares proposed by Lewes were imposed administratively by the 
British Government for 1965/6 onwards and the grants in aid to the recurrent 
budgets of the territories were adjusted in compensation. The present 
position therefore is that South Africa pays out to each country on the 
basis of the original percentages and transfers take place from Lesotho to 
the other two countries . 
Tablo 3 
South African Customs Union 
Share under the 1910 Agreement Proposed Reallocation 
Lesotho 0.88575 0.47093 
Bot swana 0 .27522 0 .30971 
Swaziland 0.14900 0 .53033 
1.31097 1.31097 
An important disadvantage of the South African customs union is 
that, in practice, BLS have no control over what is, in other less developed 
countries, a major source of government revenue and a powerful instrument 
of economic policy, namely customs and excise policy and rates. It is true 
that the agreement nrovides that the common external tariff may be altered 
both by South Africa and the territories, but in practice, alterations are 
initiated only by the South African government. During the colonial period 
informal consultations did take place between South Africa and Great Britain 
acting on behalf of the territories, but the effective voice was naturally 
that of South Africa. 
and the growth of their customs revenues, for the latter depend on the state 
of trade in the Republic and the level of its duties . A recession in the 
Republic leading to a drop in imports and a fall in customs revenue would 
automatically reduce the revenue of BLS proportionately. A large proportion 
of tax revenue in BLS is effectively cut of the control of the governments 
of BLS and cannot be influenced by any measures taken by those governments. 
As can be seen from Table 1 the percentage of ordinary revenue falling into 
this category in 1955/6 amounted to 00%, 35% and 32% for Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland respectively. This situation evidently greatly complicates 
the fiscal problems which accompany economic growth. Moreover, to the extent 
that the South African government limits imports by protective tariffs or 
quantitative restrictions for the purpose of building up its domestic 
industries, revenues in BLS will be lower than they otherwise would have been. 
Thus there is no direct relationship between economic .growth in BLS 
It is these considerations, together with the heavy dependence of BLS on 
South African products which results from the customs union, which helps to 
explain the relatively low contribution of customs and excise revenues to 
total revenues . In other African countries at comparable stages of development 
the proportion contributed by this group of taxes is commonly between 50 and 60%. 
Partly for this reason, even if the three countries receive their 
properly attributable share of South Africa's customs and excise revenues it 
does not follow that the customs agreement necessarily results in a fair fiscal 
deal for them, still less than the arrangements are necessarily favourable 
to their economic development. Broader considerations are obviously relevant. 
They are particularly so in this case because of the great disparity in size 
of the members of the union and the high degree of trade dependence of the 
smaller members which is unparalleled in any other customs union in Africa. 
Market integration creates a wider market for manufactures and products in 
the customs area, which may benefit all partners.. But the smaller non-
industrialised members may not benefit in the absence of a redistribution of 
income towards them by fiscal means, some agreed means of directing industrial 
development towards them, or favourable mirkets for their primary products . 
The non-industrialised partners have to meet the higher costs of goods from 
their partners which accompany trade diversion and they are unlikely to be 
able to establish industries to enjoy access to the larger market without 
protection. Although in principle they may benefit from the spread effect 
or from preferential access to the markets of their partners for their primary 
products, the balance of advantage need not be favourable. The Lewes inquiry 
altogether neglected these considerations. 
So far as concerns the market for local manufactures, there is little 
reason to believe that the operation of the common market has been other than 
detrimental to the three territories. Since 1925, South African policy has 
been designed to encourage her secondary industries behind a protective 
tariff (9). Quantitative import restrictions have been used for the same 
purpose. The protection afforded to South African products in the markets 
of BLS has enabled them to assume a dominant position in those markets. 
Although in some cases the South African products are certainly competitive 
with imports, often the imported product would be cheaper. The nxcess cost 
falls on the three countries. As noted already, the protective nature of 
the South Arr ican tariff and import restrictions have also operated to reduce 
the amount of revenue which would be available for distribution, although 
the Republic's need to impose duties for fiscal as well as protective purposes 
has ensured that there has been no absolute decrease in the yield of the South 
African tariff. 
Although in principle the customs agreement offers BLS access to 
the Large South African market for its manufactures, not surprisingly few 
manufactures have been established. Except in rare cases establishment of 
manufacturing industry in the face of the advantages of the economies of 
large scale production, modern technology and a developed infrastructure which 
are enjoyed by South Africa is unlikely . Admittedly some such industries 
have been set up, but this has occurred mainly in Swaziland where development 
has been able to take place in fields which are not competitive with South 
Africa's protected industries. The absence of job reservation in BLS might 
appear to offer some offsetting advantages for the establishment there 
of labour-intensive industries serving the South African market, but the 
ambiguity of the present agreement, and the administrative discretion which 
can be exercised by the South African authorities in relation to capital export 
and other matters limit the possibilities. 
In this connection it must be noted that although the present 
agreement provides for "free interchange" of product and manufactures between 
South Africa and the territories, the term "free interchange" is ambiguous. 
It has been interpreted to mean free of duty, leaving it open to South Africa 
to impose quantitative restrictions . This she has done in the case of 
primary products exported from the territories and in the case of manufactures 
the same interpretation could be employed. Admittedly, the same alternative 
is presumably open in principle to the territories but this is of limited 
interest since few industries are likely to be established unless they have 
access to the South African market. 
Nevertheless, although in some cases South Africa has imposed 
quantitative import restrictions on primary products coming from the territories 
within the limits of the quotas the products of BLS are treated on the same 
footing as products from South Africa and enjoy access to its highly protected 
internal market. Wool, meat, citrus, and cotton are marketed through 
South African marketing boards (10) and so, until 1954-s was Swaziland's 
sugar. In the absence of empirical data it is impossible to determine 
the balance of advantage to the territories in respect of their access to 
the South African domestic and overseas market for primary productss but they 
may have been quite favourable in terms of savings in marketing costs, and 
prices obtained. But the quotas imposed (as with livestock) limit the gains. 
Moreover, for some product not marketed through boards such as timber, 
there appears to have been a tendency for the South African government to 
discourage the purchase of the products of BLS by administrative means when 
the interests of South African producers have demanded this. 
Apart from the customs union itself, it is necessary to consider the 
costs and benefits which arise as a result of the monetary integration of 
BLS with South Africa. As already noted, the three countries use the notes 
and coins of the Republic and are served by commercial banks which are very 
closely linked to those operating in the Republic. These arrangements have 
both advantages and disadvantages as compared with the alternative of an 
independent monetary system. A most important advantage is that trade is 
facilitated bv the absence of any exchange risk, restrictions, inconvenience 
or cost in transactions with the principal trading partners of BLS. In addition 
membership of the currency union should facilitate the flow of private capital 
to BLS to the extent that the general credit conditions of the Republic 
permit this, and so long as there are no administrative interferences. Moreover 
no foreign exchange problem arises in servicing external debts, which is a 
consideration which should facilitate the raising of loans for development 
purposes from places other than the Republic. Provided that a project is viable 
in the sense that it can produce an operating surplus sufficient to service 
the loans raised to finance it, there is no difficulty in securing foreign 
exchange as sometimes occurs in countries having their own currencies. These 
are important advantages. 
Among the disadvantages of monetary integration are that outflow 
of savings and capital cannot be prevented and that money and credit conditions 
are determined by conditions in the Republic. In addition, the three countries 
derive no income from the capital which the holders of South African currency 
are in effect making available to the South African authorities. Nor do these 
countries derive any capital finance from the currency circulation. 
Normally a currency union which is based on mutual agreement includes 
provision for distributing among its members the interest income made 
•possible by the investment of the currency backing. Where a 100% reserve 
is not maintained; some provision of fiduciary finance is also possible. 
In the Equatorial and West African monetary unions, profits from the currency 
are distributed on the basis of the known currency distribution. In the 
case of East Africa, the profits of the former East African Currency Board 
were distributed on the basis of a formula which attempted to approximate 
to the unknown currency distribution amongst its members. The amounts which 
might justly be claimed by BLS on this account cannot be ascertained precisely 
in the absence of firm knowledge of the currency circulation. Nevertheless, 
with the aid of national income estimates and using relationships between 
income and currency circulation which are found in countries at a comparable 
level of economic development elsewhere in Africa, a plausible estimate could 
certainly be made (11). 
The third important economic link between BLS and South Africa 
concerns the labour market . Here the balance of advantage of the present 
arrangements appears less open to doubt . The benefits are certainly important 
and on balance the arrangements are certainly advantageous to BLS . A sub-
stantial contribution to the national income of Lesotho and to a lesser extent 
in Botswana and Swaziland, is derived from remittances by or on behalf of 
migrant workers employed in South African mines and agriculture. It has been 
estimated that in 1954/5 £3,559,000 was sent or taken back to Lesotho on 
behalf of migrant labourers. In Botswana for the same year the corresponding 
total was £1,139,000. For Swaziland the estimate was £383,000.(12) To some 
degree such incomes are likely to be earned at the cost of foregone 
agricultural production in the territories since the migrants tend to represent 
mainly the more enterprising and able bodied members of the male labour force, 
but even so there is certainly a substantial net gain to the three countries . 
k Revision of Economic Relationships in Southern Africa 
It is only in the last few years with the approach of independence 
that there has been any attempt on the part of the Colonial Office or within 
the local administrations to evaluate the merits of the economic links with 
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the Republic, the possibility of negotiating improved arrangements and 
alternative courses of action. In relation to the customs union itself, 
a stimulus was provided by the prospect of having to form a view on a new 
customs agreement for which the Republic produced a draft in anticipation 
of the forthcoming independence of the territories. The deteriorating 
budgetary position of the three countries also prompted economic surveys (13) 
The reports which resulted gave some attention to fiscal policy but did not 
consider the possibility of improvement in the fiscal deal except for some 
changes which would make it possible for BLS to raise more revenue, primarily 
from their own consumers. 
If the present economic and fiscal arrangements are deemed to be -., 
unsatisfactory and a satisfactory improvement is impossible to negotiate, it 
would in principle be possible/one or more of the three countries / for 
to opt out of them. They could establish their own customs system and 
possibly a tariff more suited to their own needs, and proceed to protect their 
infant industries . They could also establish their own monetary systems . The 
costs of administration would have to be borne by the country introducing them. 
At the time of writing there has been no detailed evaluation of the 
practicability and the costs of operating separate customs services although 
rough estimates have been made of the likely capital and recurrent costs 
which 
involved in the operation of border -osts/would have to be counted against 
any additional revenue made possible by a separate system. It would also be 
necessary to negotiate a transit agreement for goods in bond with South Africa 
and the cost of its operation would have to be borne by any territory seeking 
to establish its own service. 
Clearly the benefits from operating separate customs services would 
depend on the character of the tariff structure established and the 
effectiveness with which duty on the major dutiable imports could be collected 
In discussing the possibilitjr of separate customs services, the report on 
The Development of the Swaziland Economy suggests that the revenues derived 
by Swaziland from the existing customs agreement "are not less than she would 
raise if she had her own customs administration levying the same rates of 
duty" (1M-). A similar statement is found in the Botswana Report (15) . 
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These statements presumably reflect the findings of the Lewes Report and 
j 
imply that South African products would not be taxed. But there would clearly 
be little purpose in having a separate customs administration if South African 
products were not taxed. A more relevant question would be how much revenue 
could be raised if a non-discriminatory tariff on all imports were raised. 
Obviously the revenue raised from a separate customs administration 
is not the only consideration to take account in deciding the policy options. 
Except to the extent that the prices of South African goods fell as a result 
of the tariff or it resulted in a diversion of demand to cheaper sources 
outside South Africa, the increased revenue would not represent a real income 
gain but merely a transfer from consumers in the three countries to the 
exchequers. On the other hand, at the present time the prosperity of the 
three countries depend, though in varying degrees, on free access to the 
domestic, or overseas markets of South Africa . Any income gain from a change 
in the fiscal system would have to be weighed against the corresponding income 
losses which might ensue if access to markets in the Republic were to be 
limited as a result of a change in the customs union. Important factors in 
this respect are the proportion of their exports which are marketed in the 
Republic, the prospects for the development of additional production which 
could only be marketed profitably in the Republic: and alternative markets 
outside the Republic . The lack of empirical data on these questions and 
uncertainty about the response of the Republic make it difficult to form a 
judgement on. this issue. 
Currency and banking is a second area where in principle alternative 
arrangements could be considered. The advantages and disadvantages of the 
present arrangements have been noted above . On the eve of independence in 
1966 both Lesotho and Botswana sought expert advice about their future 
currency arrangements. (16) The issue of a separate currency for any of the 
three countries would present no great difficulty . The main advantage xrould 
be that if it were backed by the rand or a major international currency, the 
income from the assets backing the currency could be expected to yield a small 
profit after deducting operating costs . New currencies could be introduced 
without reference to South Africa if the backing were rand deposits or securities . 
On the other hand if sterling or some other international currency were 
employed, it would be necessary because of the operation of exchange control 
in South Africa, to enter into negotiations with that country in order to 
arrange for withdrawn South African currency to be converted into the chosen 
international currency. In the circumstances, use of the South African Rand 
would be a natural choice. It would be the best way of avoiding the possibility 
that South Africa would introduce exchange control on transactions with BLS. 
Moreover, if agreement were reached on the interchangeability of notes within 
BLS and South Africa little, if any convenience for trade would result. 
Bearing in mind the fact that the establishment of a separate currency would 
create very little scope for the pursuit of independent monetary or credit 
policies the conclusion of the experts called in to advise Lesotho on this 
question was "it seems highly questionable whether the advantage Basutoland 
could derive from a separate currency at the present time would compensate 
for the disadvantages" (17), but they avoided trying to quantify the gains. 
The common market and the currency are the principal fields in which 
there is likely to be on balance some net disadvantage to BLS from the 
existing arrangements. In the labour market there is on the other hand a 
large positive gain. Evidently the possible repercussions of a change in 
present customs and currency arrangements on the earnings of migrant labour 
in South Africa would have to be weighed up . Nevertheless there is no reason 
to suppose that a revision of the customs and currency arrangements would 
in themselves entail major changes in the present or prospective position of 
these countries' nationals working in South Africa. The long run policy of 
the South African government with respect to foreign '-'bantu" labour is 
quite clear . During the Verwoerd government a committee was appointed to 
examine the position of "foreign" Africans in the Republic (18). Among 
the Committee's main recommendations was that the dependents of foreign 
workers should be immediately repatriated and that the long term aim should 
be the repartiation of the workers themselves . It was recognised that 
this would be impracticable imnBdiately and an exception was therefore 
proposed for workers in mines and on farms . For these an annual quota for 
admission was recommended, in which BLS would receive preference. The 
principal recommendations of the committee were later accepted by the 
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South African government and indicate the long term framework in which, in the 
absence of change in South Africa, the labour policies of BLS must be formulated. 
In the immediate future however, BLS need probably have little fear of a 
curtailment of employment opportunities in South Africa, for although these 
benefit BLS, the addition to the labour' supply also benefits South African 
industry and agriculture substantially and these benefits are not likely to be 
foregone. It seems to be widely agreed in South Africa that it would be 
impossible at present for her to replace much of this labour from domestic 
sources. The effect of any substantial reduction in the supply of foreign 
labour on. the wage level in mines and farms in South Africa could therefore 
be considerable and this repercussion is unlikely to be overlooked by a 
government whose internal price level is somewhat inflexible, geared as it is 
to the fixed price of gold. When it becomes in the domestic interests of 
South Africa to repatriate workers from BLS or to reduce the inflow this will 
no doubt be done. A failure to recast the customs arrangements may well impede 
the development which will ultimate^ be necessary not only to absorb displaced 
migratory workers but also to provide a living for the steadily growing labour 
force of. BLS. . 
In the light of all the uncertainties concerning the benefits from 
opting out of the existing arrangements it is not surprising that thinking 
in BLS has centred not on removing but on Improving the existing arrangements 
on the most favourable terms possible. Evidently access to the large markets 
of South-Africa could be a major asset to the. three countries although the 
need for South Africa to look after its Bantustans (19) first may sharply 
limit what can be hoped for in this direction. Nevertheless there is no 
indicati on that South Africa may not be persuaded to support a substantially 
more favourable arrangement than the present one. 
The foregoing review of the working of the existing arrangements has 
indicated some of their more important disadvantages from the standpoint of 
BLS which may be summarised as follows. It is not in practice possible for 
BLS to protect their infant industries . The present agreement provides only 
for free interchange of products and manufactures and has been interpreted 
to permit the imposition of quantitative restrictions which have been imposed 
on primary products. There is no consultation on fiscal or monetary policies. 
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The attribution of revenue though probably correct overall (and, after the 
administrative reallocation, for each territory individually) does not 
provide a fair fiscal deal. And no revenue is derived from the use of the 
Rand as currency . Many matters are undoubtedly settled to the disadvantage 
of the territories in the field of trade as result of the exercise of administr-
ative discretion. Import prohibitions in particular may operate to the dis-
advantage of the three countries. These disadvantages indicate the general 
lines of the new deal which -the territories should seek. Four important 
changes seem to be desirable in any new agreement. 
In the first place, some formal provision should be sought for the 
establishment of a consultative body to be concerned with the operation of 
the customs union. Evidently the great disparity between the economic power 
of the Republic and the three territories make it unreasonable and unrealistic 
to suppose that the territories can have any important voice in the determin-
ation of fiscal and tariff policies, and the machinery employed in the East 
African Coercion Market and elsewhere is hardly likely to be acceptable to 
South Africa. Nevertheless, a situation in which the territories have no right 
even to be informed of prospective changes in tariff policy by South Africa 
or to represent their own needs is clearly unsatisfactory and hardly consistent 
with the new status of these countries . Consultation may improve the chances 
of avoiding at least some changes which are clearly detrimental to the interests 
of BLS and could facilitate consideration of their needs for certain protective 
tariffs which may be of decisive importance for their own development. For 
instance, a protective tariff on soda ash could be of considerable benefit to 
Botswana by reserving the South African market to it and the cost to the 
Republic might be relatively small. 
In the second place, it is highly desirable that a revision of the 
agreement should include provision permitting the three countries temporarily 
to impose either quantitative import restrictions or a tariff upon South 
African products which compete with prspective infant industries. The change 
of BLS being able successfully to establish manufacturing industries in the 
absence of such provisions are small. It is understood that the draft 
agreement first proposed by South Africa contained no provision for protecting 
infant industries in BLS but would, on the contrary, have permitted South Africa's 
already established industries to receive protection against competition from BLS. 
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In the third place an upward revision of the fiscal payment to the 
territories should be sought . The grounds for this are that the customs 
agreement results in the replacement of lower cost foreign products by higher 
cost products from the Republic. Although the case for some additional 
compensation seems strong, the amount which might justly be claimed is difficult 
to determine. Moreover, as we have seen, each of the countries probably 
enjoys some offsetting gains from its access to the markets of the Republic 
for their orimarjr products. A further complication is that South Africa's 
gains from the present arrangements need not be equal to the losses which 
may be incurred by the' territories. 
One commonly advocated method of dealing with the' cost of trade 
diversion to the smaller members of a common market involves providing fiscal 
compensation based on the revenue losses assumed to be incurred by the country 
importing the products of its partners duty free. Such a basis was employed in 
the Trade Agreement of 1964- between the Government of Nyasaland and the 
Government of Southern Rhodesia. (20) Under this agreement the Government of 
Southern Rhodesia agreed to pay to the Government of Southern Rhodesia 10% of 
its trade surplus with Nyasaland after excluding certain products such as 
those subject to excise in Nyasaland (beer, cigarettes, etc.) and un-
manufactured local products. The rate of 10% appears to have been fixed as 
a rough approximation to the average rate of duty foregone by Nyasaland as 
a result of the maintenance of the customs union between the two countries 
after the break up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
Of course, the customs revenue loss is not a particularly relevant 
basis for fiscal compensation except in a limiting case. Part of any revenue 
loss from the free trade arrangements in BLS represents merely a foregone 
transfer from their producers and consumers to the public exchequer and not 
any loss of real resources. On the other'hand, any fiscal payment from the 
Republic would represent an increment of real income to the territories, part 
of which could properly be regarded as compensation for their having to buy 
South African products at a. higher price than imports from the rest of the 
world. The customs revenue loss calculations should be taken to represent 
an upper limit to the real income losses imposed on the territories. 
- 21 -
An alternative base for nroviding compensation suggested by-
Professor D. V. Cowen (21) would involve allocating the shares of South 
Africa import revenues to the territories on the basis of the ratios of the 
total net manufactured imports of the four territories, irrespective of 
whether these imoorts come from abroad or are manufactured in South Africa . 
Yet another suggestion entails retaining the shares indicated by 
the attribution procedures currently employed, and giving the territories in 
addition a share of the -income tax on the profits of the manufacturing and 
commercial sector in South Africa. There is a precedent for this in the 
arrangements adopted in East Africa for the Distributable Pool which was set 
up on the recommendations of the Raisman Commission. 
Data are not available to show the effects of these alternative 
bases except for that based on the ratios of the net manufactured imports, 
the effects of which are indicated in Table 4- , for 1965 . As can be seen this 
basis would result in more than doubling the shares received by the 
territories as a whole . 
Table 4: The South African Customs Union 
(i) Present Effective 
proportion of S. African 
Customs & Excise Revenue 
(ii) Amount 1965/6 (R.000) 
(iii) Share based on Ratios 
of Net tfenufactured 
Imports (excl. imputed 
into BLS) wines, beers, 
spirits 
(iv) Amount based on (iii) 
(R.000) 
Bot swana 
0.30971 
(1,021) 
0 .84 
1,918 
Lesotho 
0 .47093 
1,222 
0 .76 
1,735 
Swaz iland Total 
0.53033 1.31097 
1,393 
1 .46 
3 ,333 
3.06 
6',986 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook, Pretoria, 
Swaziland Annual Statistical Bulletin, The Statistical Office, Mbabane. 
Lesotho, Annual Statistical Bulletin, Bureau of Statistics Maseru 
Botswana, Statistical \brtract, Central Statistical Office, Ministry 
of Finance, Gaberones 
Not es 
(1) 1964/5.. 
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Fourthly, in considering the terms of any revised agreement it would 
be desirable to try to provide increased scope for the territories to increase 
their indirect tax revenues by autonmous action. For instance, it would be 
desirable to authorise the territories specifically to impose export taxes 
on their primary products. Almost certainly the incidence of these taxes is 
on the producers and the tax represents a very convenient way of taxing cattle 
producers. Two out of the three territories already impose such taxes, 
although it is doubtful if their actions are consistent with the Customs 
Agreement. Apart from this it would be desirable to give the territories 
flexibility to determine their own excise duties on beer wines and spirits 
instead of requiring them to conform to the rates in force in the Republic 
which are on the whole low. Evidently the scope for major differences would 
be limited by the need to prevent smuggling . There may even be grounds for 
going beyond this and permitting the territories to impose levies taking the 
form of a turnover tax on a limited range of other commodities.(22) 
If such levies were imposed on a non discriminatory basis they would not upset 
South Africa's privileged position in the markets of the three and, since 
the incidence would be largely on the consumers, the levies could not be 
represented as seriously harmful to South Africa's interests or inconsistent 
with the spirit of the integration arrangements . 
Finally, it would be desirable to seek either as part of a broader 
economic agreement, or separately, provisions which would meet some of the 
problems on the monetary side. In the first instance some machinery needs to 
be established for consultation between the monetary authorities in South 
Africa and the Finance Ministeries in the three countries . Possibly 
representation on the board of the Reserve Bank of South Africa might be 
sought . One of the main purposes of this consultation would be to acquaint 
each party with the thinking of the other-on monetary and credit policies, 
and in particular to try to ensure that credit in BLS was.adjusted as far 
as possible in conformity with their needs rather than those of the Republic . 
Scope could easily bo provided for the exercise of a differential credit 
policy. In addition, measures might be discussed which would lead to a greater 
proportion of the savings of BLS being invested locally rather than in South 
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Africa. Finally efforts should be made to obtain an annual payment from 
South Africa in consideration of the circulation of South African currency in 
the territories , The annual income which might be obtained from separate 
currencies backed by the Rand might be of the order of £80,000 for Lesotho, 
£4-0,000 in the case of Botswana and £40-80,000 in the case of Swaziland. (23) 
A successful outcome to the negotiations might be encouraged if 
the British government were to give assurances that its budgetary assistance 
to the territories would not be cut immediately in proportion to any increased 
payments from South Africa. If this is not done, any increases will not 
immediately benefit the territories and could be represented as transferring 
funds from South Africa to Britain, which is hardly a helpful background for 
negotiation. 
Evidently the scope for improving the terms of economic association 
between South Africa and BLS is greatly influenced by the interplay of 
political factors and the greatly disparate bargaining power of the interested 
parties. The absence of empirical data on a range of important matters also 
makes it difficult to base the negotiations on hard facts and increases the 
uncertainity of the outcome . It is unlikely that any future arrangements 
will be satisfactory in all respects to every party and it will be necessary 
for each to make a judgement on their overall effects from their own standpoint . 
A generous response on the part of South Africa to the changes which consider-
ations of economics and equity seem to justify need cost relatively little but 
could make the maintenance of economic association of decisive advantage to 
the territories. In the absence of such a response some at least of the 
territories seem likely to have alternatives open to them which on further 
analysis may turn out to be more attractive than the maintenance of the 
status quo. 
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